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The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule 
William Baude† & Ryan D. Doerfler†† 
When should a court interpreting some statutory provision consider infor-
mation besides the text—legislative history, surrounding provisions, practical con-
sequences, the statute’s title, etc.? This might be one of the most asked questions of 
statutory interpretation. 
One recurring answer in the Court’s cases is the “plain meaning rule,” which 
is something of a compromise. If the statute’s meaning is “plain,” the other infor-
mation can’t be considered. If it isn’t plain, the information comes in. The rule seems 
to make obvious sense as an intermediate position between strict textualism and 
some form of pragmatism. 
And yet, once we think a little more deeply about the plain meaning rule, we 
ought to see that its basic structure is puzzling. Information that is relevant 
shouldn’t normally become irrelevant just because the text is clear. And vice versa: 
irrelevant information shouldn’t become useful just because the text is less than 
clear. We can sketch some conditions under which this puzzling structure could be 
justified, but we highly doubt that they could justify the plain meaning rule in its 
current form. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Many tenets of statutory interpretation take a peculiar form. 
They allow consideration of outside information—legislative his-
tory, practical consequences, the statute’s title, etc.—but only if 
the statute’s text1 is unclear or ambiguous. These tenets are often 
expressed as a variation of the “plain meaning rule.” If the text’s 
meaning is “plain,” the other information can’t be considered. If it 
isn’t plain, the information comes in. 
On its surface, the rule has an intuitive appeal. It seems like 
a safe intermediate position between strict textualism and some 
form of all-things-considered eclecticism or pragmatism. But if we 
poke below the surface, we ought to see that the basic structure 
of the plain meaning rule is quite puzzling. In our normal lives, 
in most contexts under the rules of evidence, and elsewhere, in-
formation is either useful or not. Information that is relevant 
shouldn’t normally become irrelevant just because the text is 
clear. And vice versa, irrelevant information shouldn’t become 
useful just because the text is less than clear. 
This puzzling structure—“consider only in case of ambigu-
ity”—deserves investigation. In this Article, we first explain the 
puzzle more formally, and then begin that investigation. It turns 
out that we can sketch some conditions under which this puzzling 
structure could be justified, for certain kinds of evidence. But no-
body has shown that the plain meaning rule in fact meets these 
conditions, and we rather doubt that they could justify the plain 
 
 1 To be sure, considering “just” the text requires attention to minimal information 
about the text (for example, that it is a legislative text). See generally John R. Searle, 
Literal Meaning, 13 Erkenntnis 207 (1978). 
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meaning rule across the board. More importantly, we suspect that 
most interpreters have never even asked themselves the question. 
Note that we do not take a position on whether one ought to 
be a textualist or an intentionalist or something else in the first 
place. That is of course “the big debate”2 in statutory interpreta-
tion. Similarly, we take no position here on the correct theory of 
statutory “meaning.”3 This is not to deny that there are right an-
swers to these questions. But the plain meaning rule attempts to 
transcend those debates, and our criticisms of it do, too. 
Textualists who think they have good reasons to ignore legis-
lative history or the like shouldn’t automatically cave when the 
statute is ambiguous. Intentionalists who insist that legislative 
history is relevant shouldn’t automatically discard it when the 
text by itself seems clear. The plain meaning rule asks both sides 
to surrender the courage of their convictions. That surrender has 
not been justified, and perhaps cannot be. 
I.  THE PLAIN MEANING RULE 
The plain meaning rule says that otherwise-relevant infor-
mation about statutory meaning is forbidden when the statutory 
text is plain or unambiguous. To see the rule in action, we need 
not look far. Consider one of the Court’s recent and entertaining 
statutory interpretation cases, Yates v United States,4 in which 
the Court split 4–1–4 on interpreting a provision of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 20025 that is now codified at 18 USC § 1519.6 Did 
§ 1519’s prohibition on impeding a federal investigation by 
“knowingly . . . conceal[ing] . . . any record, document, or tangible 
object”7 apply to a boat captain who threw undersized fish back 
 
 2 William N. Eskridge Jr, Book Review, The New Textualism and Normative Can-
ons, 113 Colum L Rev 531, 532 (2013). See also Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Avoid-
ance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum L Rev 1189, 1241 (2006) (observing the “lively 
and ongoing academic debate over whether it is legitimate for courts to rely on extratex-
tual sources when construing statutes”) (emphasis omitted). 
 3 See Richard H. Fallon Jr, The Meaning of Legal “Meaning” and Its Implications for 
Theories of Legal Interpretation, 82 U Chi L Rev 1235, 1243–52 (2015). See also Frederick 
Schauer, An Essay on Constitutional Language, 29 UCLA L Rev 797, 798–99 (1982). 
 4 135 S Ct 1074 (2015). 
 5 Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745. 
 6 Yates, 135 S Ct at 1079 (Ginsburg) (plurality). 
 7 18 USC § 1519. We might be accused of stacking the deck in the government’s favor 
by omitting the other verbs from our quotation. See Yates, 135 S Ct at 1086 (Ginsburg) (plu-
rality) (relying on the verbs); id at 1089–90 (Alito concurring in the judgment) (same). But 
we’re not actually concerned here with the many other interpretive moves in Yates, so we 
assure you they are omitted without prejudice. 
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into the sea?8 In particular, could “tangible object” include things 
that are quite different from records and documents?9 Five jus-
tices said no; four said yes. 
There is much to be said about the case,10 but for our purposes 
the noteworthy exchange was about the relevance of the statute’s 
title. The plurality, which narrowly construed the statute, started 
by pointing out that both the provision’s caption11 and the title of 
its section of the statute12 mentioned only “records” and “docu-
ments.”13 While “not commanding,” the plurality said, these head-
ings “supply cues” that “tangible object” should be construed very 
narrowly.14 Justice Samuel Alito, who concurred in the judgment 
and provided the fifth vote for the defendant, similarly noted that 
his view was “influenced by § 1519’s title.”15 
Justice Elena Kagan wrote the dissent. She replied that the 
Court had never before “relied on a title to override the law’s clear 
terms.”16 Instead, she invoked “the wise rule that the title of a 
statute and the heading of a section cannot limit the plain mean-
ing of the text.”17 This is an instance of the plain meaning rule, 
whose key feature is to deny the relevance of other interpretive 
data if the text’s meaning is “plain” or “clear.” 
Invocations of the rule are common. That same term, in King 
v Burwell,18 the Court dutifully reported that “[i]f the statutory 
language is plain, we must enforce it according to its terms.”19 
 
 8 See Yates, 135 S Ct at 1078–79 (Ginsburg) (plurality). 
 9 See id at 1079 (Ginsburg) (plurality). 
 10 See generally, for example, Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Yates and the 
Statutes We Threw Away, 18 Green Bag 2d 377 (2015); Richard M. Re, The New Holy 
Trinity, 18 Green Bag 2d 407 (2015). 
 11 See Yates, 135 S Ct at 1083 (Ginsburg) (plurality). See also 18 USC § 1519 (cap-
tioning the section “Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investi-
gations and bankruptcy”). 
 12 See Yates, 135 S Ct at 1083 (Ginsburg) (plurality). See also Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
§ 802, 116 Stat at 800 (entitling the section “Criminal penalties for altering documents”). 
 13 See Yates, 135 S Ct at 1083 (Ginsburg) (plurality). 
 14 Id (Ginsburg) (plurality). 
 15 Id at 1090 (Alito concurring in the judgment). 
 16 Id at 1094 (Kagan dissenting). 
 17 Yates, 135 S Ct at 1094 (Kagan dissenting) (emphasis added), quoting Brotherhood 
of Railroad Trainmen v Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co, 331 US 519, 528–29 (1947). See 
also Trainmen, 331 US at 528 (“Where the text is complicated and prolific, headings and 
titles can do no more than indicate the provisions in a most general manner; to attempt to 
refer to each specific provision would often be ungainly as well as useless.”). 
 18 135 S Ct 2480 (2015). 
 19 Id at 2489. As many probably know, the Court found that the language was not 
plain. Id at 2490. 
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Often, the rule is invoked to forbid reliance on a specific kind 
of source. The statutory titles ignored by Kagan’s opinion in Yates 
may seem like a minor point, but consider these perhaps more 
significant examples: 
Legislative History. Despite legislative history’s critics, the 
Supreme Court as a whole has not categorically foresworn the use 
of legislative history. In some opinions, however, it has said that 
legislative history can be considered only if the text is ambiguous 
or unclear. In Tennessee Valley Authority v Hill,20 for instance, the 
Court said that “[w]hen confronted with a statute which is plain 
and unambiguous on its face, we ordinarily do not look to legisla-
tive history as a guide to its meaning.”21 Similarly, in its more 
recent decision in United States v Woods,22 the Court dismissed 
legislative history arguments with a footnote saying: “We do not 
consider Woods’ arguments based on legislative history. Whether 
or not legislative history is ever relevant, it need not be consulted 
when, as here, the statutory text is unambiguous.”23 Similar invo-
cations of the rule are plentiful.24 
Policy Considerations. Once again, the Court has certainly 
deemed the practical consequences or policy implications of inter-
pretation to be relevant in some cases. But it has also said that 
they need not be considered when the meaning of the text is plain. 
For example, in Carcieri v Salazar,25 the Court concluded that it 
“need not consider [ ] competing policy views” in interpreting the 
statutory language “because Congress’ use of the word ‘now’ . . . 
speaks for itself.”26 Similarly, in Sebelius v Cloer,27 the Court 
turned aside the government’s arguments that the Vaccine Act28 
“should be construed so as to minimize complex and costly fees 
litigation,” concluding that such “policy arguments come into play 
 
 20 437 US 153 (1978). 
 21 Id at 184 n 29. 
 22 134 S Ct 557 (2013). 
 23 Id at 567 n 5. 
 24 See, for example, Milner v Department of the Navy, 562 US 562, 572 (2011) (refus-
ing to “allow[ ] ambiguous legislative history to muddy clear statutory language”); Lamie 
v United States Trustee, 540 US 526, 533–34 (2004); Barnhart v Sigmon Coal Co, 534 US 
438, 457 (2002). 
 25 555 US 379 (2009). 
 26 Id at 392. 
 27 133 S Ct 1886 (2013). 
 28 National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986, Pub L No 99-660, 100 Stat 3755, 
codified at 42 USC § 300aa-1 et seq. 
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only to the extent that the Vaccine Act is ambiguous,”29 which it 
was not.30 
Practice. The plain meaning rule may also operate to forbid 
invocations of practice. For instance, in United States v Ron Pair 
Enterprises, Inc,31 the Court concluded that “pre-Code practice” 
was relevant to interpreting the Bankruptcy Code only if the text 
was not clear.32 And in Milner v Department of the Navy,33 the 
Court rejected the government’s and dissent’s invocations of 
thirty years of lower court practice “even if true, because we have 
no warrant to ignore clear statutory language on the ground that 
other courts have done so.”34 
Substantive Canons. Several of the so-called substantive can-
ons of interpretation turn on whether the statute is ambiguous, 
and so they present instances of the plain meaning rule as well.35 
For instance, the Court has rejected an “effort to avoid the plain 
meaning of the statute” by “invok[ing] the canon of constitutional 
avoidance,” because “that canon ‘has no application in the absence 
of statutory ambiguity.’”36 The same may be true of a range of 
other substantive canons.37 
All of them. Other times, the rule is invoked more categori-
cally, as in this oft-quoted statement in Connecticut National 
Bank v Germain:38 
[I]n interpreting a statute a court should always turn first to 
one, cardinal canon before all others. We have stated time and 
again that courts must presume that a legislature says in a 
statute what it means and means in a statute what it says 
 
 29 Cloer, 133 S Ct at 1895 (brackets and quotation marks omitted). 
 30 Id at 1896. 
 31 489 US 235 (1989). 
 32 Id at 245–46. 
 33 562 US 562 (2011). 
 34 Id at 575–76. 
 35 These are an apt example only to the extent that substantive considerations are 
used as evidence of statutory meaning, and not as policy tools used to fill statutory gaps. 
See Lawrence B. Solum, The Interpretation-Construction Distinction, 27 Const Commen 
95, 105–07 (2010). 
 36 Department of Housing and Urban Development v Rucker, 535 US 125, 134 (2002), 
quoting United States v Oakland Cannabis Buyers’ Cooperative, 532 US 483, 494 (2001). 
 37 See Brett M. Kavanaugh, Book Review, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 Harv 
L Rev 2118, 2146–56 (2016). 
 38 503 US 249 (1992). 
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there. When the words of a statute are unambiguous, then, 
this first canon is also the last: judicial inquiry is complete.39 
Again, in each instance the role of the plain meaning rule is not 
to categorically rule these sources in or out. Rather, it is to make 
them contingently irrelevant. The category of extraneous infor-
mation is not considered if the statute is plain, but can be if it is 
not plain. 
Two notes of clarification before proceeding. First, we should 
note that the word “plain” is (ironically) itself ambiguous. Courts 
and scholars sometimes use the phrase “plain meaning” to denote 
something like ordinary meaning—that is, the normal meaning, 
or the meaning one would normally attribute to those words given 
little information about their context.40 The ordinary meaning is 
“plain” in the sense of “plain vanilla.” But the plain meaning rule 
uses the phrase in a different sense, to denote obvious meaning—
that is, the meaning that is clear.41 Here, meaning is “plain” in 
the sense of “plain to view.” Again, the plain meaning rule uses 
this latter sense of “plain”—the meaning that is clear or obvious. 
Second, while the “rule” is asserted in plenty of cases and has 
been defended by Justice Antonin Scalia and Professor Bryan 
Garner as “essentially sound,”42 we do not mean to assert that the 
plain meaning rule is inviolably observed. For despite the rule 
that plain text is supposed to be preclusive, the Court has also 
said that the “meaning—or ambiguity—of certain words or 
 
 39 Id at 253–54 (quotation marks and citations omitted). See also John F. Manning, 
The New Purposivism, 2011 S Ct Rev 113, 126–27 (suggesting that “the Court’s new ap-
proach” to statutory interpretation “is perhaps best captured by the Court’s oft-cited opin-
ion in Connecticut National Bank v Germain”). 
 40 See, for example, Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating 
Function of Plain Meaning, 1990 S Ct Rev 231, 251. See also David A. Strauss, Why Plain 
Meaning?, 72 Notre Dame L Rev 1565, 1565 (1997) (treating “‘ordinary’ or ‘plain’ mean-
ing” as “interchangeable”). As Professor Frederick Schauer has observed, the “plainness” 
of statutory meaning in this sense is complicated by the question whether statutory lan-
guage is ordinary or technical. See generally Frederick Schauer, Is Law a Technical Lan-
guage?, 52 San Diego L Rev 501 (2015). To the extent that statutory language consists of 
terms of art familiar to lawyers, such language might have a “plain” technical meaning—
the meaning a lawyer would normally attribute to the words upon knowing they were 
uttered by another lawyer. 
 41 See, for example, Ron Pair Enterprises, 489 US at 242 (“The language and punc-
tuation Congress used cannot be read in any other way. By the plain language of the stat-
ute, the two types of recovery are distinct.”) (citation omitted and emphases added). 
 42 Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal 
Texts 436 (Thomson/West 2012). Scalia and Garner acknowledge the difficulty of deter-
mining what is unambiguous. See note 94. 
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phrases may only become evident when placed in context,”43 and 
context is sometimes conceived quite expansively. Indeed, Profes-
sor William Eskridge Jr has argued that, despite invocations of 
the plain meaning rule, “[i]n a significant number of cases, the 
Court has pretty much admitted that it was displacing plain 
meaning with apparent legislative intent or purpose gleaned from 
legislative history.”44 
But our point stands regardless of whether the plain meaning 
rule is really a “rule” or merely a common trope. Our inquiry here 
is fundamentally normative—when does this kind of contingent 
irrelevance make sense? As we hope to show, the answer to that 
question is far trickier than most everybody seems to assume. 
II.  THE PUZZLE 
Upon closer examination, there is something puzzling about 
the plain meaning rule. There are reasons to consider all perti-
nent information. There are reasons to categorically discard cer-
tain kinds of pertinent information. But why consider it only 
sometimes? 
For examples of considering all pertinent information, think 
of federal agencies, which “must consider” all “significant com-
ments” received during notice-and-comment rulemaking,45 even if 
they were very confident in their proposed rule in the first place. 
The Environmental Protection Agency, likewise, must consider 
cost when deciding whether to regulate power plants, no matter 
the degree of noneconomic concern.46 Along the same lines, Jeremy 
Bentham famously advocated a system of “free proof,” or admis-
sion of all logically relevant evidence, on the grounds that it “was 
simply ordinary epistemology applied to legal matters.”47 
Conversely, to Bentham’s likely dismay, the law is also full of 
cases in which information is excluded, whether because it is in-
trinsically irrelevant or normatively problematic or too likely to 
 
 43 Food and Drug Administration v Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp, 529 US 120, 
132 (2000). 
 44 William N. Eskridge Jr, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L Rev 621, 628 (1990). 
 45 Perez v Mortgage Bankers Association, 135 S Ct 1199, 1203 (2015), citing Citizens 
to Preserve Overton Park, Inc v Volpe, 401 US 402, 416 (1971). 
 46 See Michigan v Environmental Protection Agency, 135 S Ct 2699, 2707–08 (2015). 
 47 Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U Pa 
L Rev 165, 169 (2006), discussing generally Jeremy Bentham, Rationale of Judicial Evi-
dence, Specially Applied to English Practice (Hunt & Clark 1827). 
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mislead.48 Federal trial courts, for example, exclude most evidence 
of character or past acts.49 And federal antidiscrimination laws 
prohibit employers from basing employment decisions on an ap-
plicant’s race, religion, or sex.50 
These categorical exclusions are easy for most to accept. But 
why make otherwise-relevant information only conditionally ad-
missible? If legislative history is truly bad evidence of statutory 
meaning, shouldn’t it be ignored both when the meaning is plain 
and when it is less than clear? Conversely, if it is good evidence, 
shouldn’t we always at least look at it, even when the text seems 
pretty clear on its own? Why should legislative history’s admissi-
bility depend on the evidence we get from another source, like the 
text? 
As we explain below, one might be able to construct a justifi-
cation for considering pertinent information only sometimes—but 
such a limit makes sense only if that “sometimes” is connected to 
some epistemic or other practical end. What makes little sense is 
a blanket prohibition against considering pertinent nontextual 
information if statutory language is “clear.” This is especially so 
if the courts’ main concern is interpretive accuracy—that is, get-
ting it right. Courts justify adherence to the plain meaning rule 
as a way to avoid interpretive mistakes, but the rule seems ill-
suited to the task. 
To see the concern more formally, suppose that plain-language 
clarity is factive: that is, if it is “clear” that some statutory lan-
guage means that p, then that language means that p in fact. So 
understood, to say that statutory language’s meaning is “clear” is 
akin to saying that its meaning is known—if, after all, a court 
knows that some statutory language means that p, then that lan-
guage in fact means that p.51 As a linguistic matter, this is a plau-
sible analysis of “clear.” The problem is that if this is what courts 
mean by “clear,” then the plain meaning rule does no work with 
respect to accuracy. If a court knows that some statutory language 
means that p just on the basis of the plain text, then considering, 
 
 48 See Schauer, 155 U Pa L Rev at 194 (cited in note 47) (“[T]he idea of Free Proof 
may have more cognitive and epistemic disadvantages than Bentham thought almost two 
centuries ago.”). 
 49 See FRE 404. 
 50 42 USC § 2000e-2(a)(1). 
 51 See Timothy Williamson, Knowledge and Its Limits 34 (Oxford 2000). 
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say, legislative history is pointless but also harmless.52 This is be-
cause the court knows, in turn, that the corresponding legislative 
history is misleading to the extent that it indicates the statutory 
language means something other than that p. 
Suppose then that courts in this area are instead speaking 
loosely, and that when a court says that statutory language is 
“clear,” what it means is that it has a high degree of confidence in 
a particular reading just on the basis of the text. On this under-
standing, there are two possibilities. The first possibility is that 
the court has such high confidence that nothing in the legislative 
history could possibly dissuade it. But, if this is the case, then the 
analysis is the same as above: considering legislative history is 
pointless but harmless. The second possibility is that, in principle, 
something in the legislative history could dissuade the court. If 
this is the case, however, then refusal to consider legislative his-
tory amounts to something like willful ignorance. In the case of 
the second possibility, the prohibitions at issue do have an effect, 
but the effect is mischievous.53 As Judge Henry Friendly ob-
served, it is “[i]llogical . . . to hold that a ‘plain meaning’ shut[s] 
off access to the very materials that might show it not to have 
been plain at all.”54 
Implicit in all of this, of course, is the assumption that the 
nontextual evidence at issue is neither intrinsically irrelevant nor 
more likely than not to mislead. If courts may consider legislative 
history if the plain statutory text is not clear, then legislative his-
tory sheds light on interpretive questions. But it is easy to see 
how the same point works for those who categorically reject using 
legislative history because it is “counterproductive” or error 
prone.55 If those concerns make legislative history so unreliable 
 
 52 This is putting aside for a moment the cost of gathering and considering the evi-
dence, which we discuss in Part III.A. 
 53 This is what differentiates the “plain meaning rule” invoked in the cases we cite 
from a more sensible “presumption” in favor of the plain meaning that “is subject to rebut-
tal,” as described by John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv L Rev 2387, 2399 
(2003). This also differentiates it from rules of cumulativeness, or “marginal probative 
value.” Old Chief v United States, 519 US 172, 185 (1997). 
 54 Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in Henry 
J. Friendly, Benchmarks 196, 206 (Chicago 1967). See also Pacific Gas and Electric Co v 
G.W. Thomas Drayage & Rigging Co, 442 P2d 641, 645 (Cal 1968) (in bank) (Traynor) 
(“The exclusion of parol evidence . . . merely because the words do not appear ambiguous 
to the reader can easily lead to the attribution to a written instrument of a meaning that 
was never intended.”) (emphasis added). 
 55 See, for example, Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial 
Competence: The Untold Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 Stan L Rev 1833, 1838 (1998) 
(arguing that “problems of judicial competence create grave risks that judicial resort to 
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that it should not even be considered when the text is clear, the 
concerns do not go away just because the text is less clear. Better 
to soldier on with one’s best estimate of the text’s meaning, even 
if uncertain, than to introduce information that is more mislead-
ing than informative. 
Our overall point is that the relevance of information is not 
normally conditional. Either legislative history, statutory titles, 
or what have you tell us something relevant about meaning or 
they do not. But whether they do or do not, that does not suddenly 
change when the text is clear. The puzzle is thus why courts 
would ignore nontextual evidence only when textual evidence 
points strongly in one direction. 
III.  POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS 
Having said all of that, we can imagine some justifications for 
some applications of the plain meaning rule—that is, some cases 
in which the conditional relevance of nontextual evidence could 
make sense. But even so, we stress that these justifications are 
both conditional and incomplete. They are conditional because 
they are merely an outline of the circumstances under which a 
plain meaning threshold might make sense. We do not think ad-
herents to the rule have shown that those circumstances actually 
obtain, and we are not sure that they do. They are incomplete be-
cause, even if those circumstances do obtain in some classes of 
cases, they are unlikely to result in an across-the-board version of 
the plain meaning rule. 
A. Cost Efficiency 
The plain meaning rule might make sense for evidence that 
is probative but also expensive to collect or consider. 
To see this, suppose that considering information A is low-
cost and easy whereas considering information B is expensive and 
cumbersome. Even if A and B are equally reliable, it might make 
sense, on a cost-efficiency rationale, to start by considering A, con-
sidering B only if A leaves you uncertain. After all, if considering 
A is cheap and good enough for practical purposes, why incur the 
 
legislative history to gauge legislative intent will prove counterproductive”); Antonin 
Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 31–32 (Princeton 1997) 
(Amy Gutmann, ed) (“[T]he use of legislative history . . . is much more likely to produce a 
false or contrived legislative intent than a genuine one.”). 
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expense of considering B? The expected marginal benefit is low 
and the cost high.56 
Less abstractly, consider apartment hunting. Seeing an 
apartment in person is a reliable way of assessing its suitability. 
It also takes a great deal of time and energy. For that reason, one 
will often reject an apartment just on the basis of pictures or in-
formation contained in a description (for example, square footage, 
floor, etc.). Because one can consider such information quickly 
and from the comfort of one’s couch, driving across town is often 
simply not worth it.57 If an apartment is a clear “no” based just on 
the ad, why bother? If, by contrast, the apartment is a “maybe,” it 
is plausibly worth scheduling a visit. 
Note that a cost-efficiency story for the plain meaning rule is 
still a little tricky. In the apartment example above, many people 
might find it less intuitive to accept an apartment and sign a lease 
without ever bothering to see it in person, even if the square foot-
age and price are perfect. Yet the plain meaning rule asks inter-
preters to ignore extraneous information both if the plain mean-
ing of the statute is the equivalent of “yes” and if it is the 
equivalent of “no.” That may be a tougher sell. 
Moreover, the cost-efficiency justification for the plain mean-
ing rule would have to justify the conditional exclusion of evidence. 
Some scholars have argued, for example, that most nontextual 
evidence should be categorically excluded in part on cost-efficiency 
grounds.58 That kind of categorical argument, of course, is too 
strong to yield the plain meaning rule. Rather, a cost-efficiency jus-
tification for the plain meaning rule would require a particular ra-
tio of costs and accuracies such that the extra evidence is too 
costly when A is clear, but not so costly that it is prohibitive when 
 
 56 See generally, for example, Remco Heesen, How Much Evidence Should One Col-
lect?, 172 Philosophical Stud 2299 (2015) (discussing the trade-off between accuracy and 
cost in the context of scientific research). See also Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and 
Norms 60 (Princeton 1990) (observing that “[f]act-finding and evaluating the different 
reasons for action consume time and effort,” and that these costs “will often outweigh the 
marginal benefits” that “ensue from engaging in a complete assessment of the situation 
on its merits”). 
 57 See Tim Logan, Apps, Sites Aim to Transform Apartment Rental Listings (LA 
Times, Nov 30, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/NNW3-ZX6L; Jonah Bromwich, Apart-
ment Hunting with a Mobile App (NY Times, Mar 14, 2014), online at http://www.nytimes 
.com/2014/03/16/nyregion/apartment-hunting-with-a-mobile-app.html (visited Mar 24, 
2017) (Perma archive unavailable). 
 58 See, for example, Adrian Vermeule, Judging under Uncertainty: An Institutional 
Theory of Legal Interpretation 189–205 (Harvard 2006). 
01 BAUDE&DOERFLER_ART_IC (DO NOT DELETE) 6/19/2017  9:45 PM 
2017] The (Not So) Plain Meaning Rule 551 
 
A is unclear. Again, this is possible, but would require a more pre-
cise quantification of the decision costs of considering different 
kinds of evidence than we have seen.59 
A cost-efficiency justification for the plain meaning rule is at 
least conceivable for some classes of evidence, but for others it is 
not even plausible. Legislative history, for example, might be 
time-consuming for courts to consider.60 The relevant documents 
are often spread out rather than collected in a single place, and 
even once they are collected it can take some time and mental 
effort to put them in their proper context—a skill at which many 
lawyers and law students are not particularly good.61 Thus, even 
assuming that legislative history is probative with respect to stat-
utory meaning, refusing to consider such history if the text is 
“clear” might make sense for already overburdened courts. Again, 
if considering just the text is cheap and good enough for practical 
purposes, maybe it is sometimes better to move on to the next case 
rather than to engage in additional, expensive investigation.62 In 
this respect, legislative history contrasts sharply with, say, titles 
or section headings, which are easy for courts to consider. It is 
hard for us to imagine any cost-exclusion justification for exclud-
ing those kinds of materials.63 
 
 59 See id at 159 (“[S]o little work has been done to assess the empirical consequences 
of interpretive choice.”). 
 60 See Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation at 36 (cited in note 55) (“The most immediate 
and tangible change the abandonment of legislative history would effect is this: Judges, 
lawyers, and clients will be saved an enormous amount of time and expense.”). 
 61 See Vermeule, 50 Stan L Rev at 1863–77 (cited in note 55). See also generally 
Frederick Schauer, Our Informationally Disabled Courts, 143 Dædalus 105 (Summer 
2014). But see Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: Legisla-
tive History by the Rules, 122 Yale L J 70, 91, 135 (2012) (arguing that “no one should try 
to understand legislative history without understanding Congress’s own rules,” but then 
asking: “Is it really ‘too complex’ or difficult for judges and academics to learn a dozen 
congressional rules?”). 
 62 Professor Adrian Vermeule has noted this possibility. See Vermeule, Judging 
under Uncertainty at 195 (cited in note 58) (“Intermediate solutions include a rule . . . 
that consults legislative history only if the statute lacks a plain meaning.”). But he is 
skeptical. See id (“[I]n practice such intermediate solutions prove highly unstable over 
any extended period and inevitably dissolve back into plenary consideration of legisla-
tive history.”). 
 63 We also note that costs might vary over time. The cost of considering other stat-
utes, for example, has decreased significantly with the development of electronic search 
tools. See Ellie Margolis and Kristen E. Murray, Say Goodbye to the Books: Information 
Literacy as the New Legal Research Paradigm, 38 U Dayton L Rev 117, 121–26 (2012). 
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B. Bias 
Perhaps the plain meaning rule could make sense for certain 
kinds of evidence that have both potential value but also a hard-
to-assess sort of bias. 
To see this formally, imagine that we can consult information 
A and/or B on some question. We know that A is 90 percent reliable 
and that B is only 60 percent reliable. On the other hand, we also 
know that once we consult B there is a substantial risk that we 
will be incapable of rationally factoring in A’s response. Somehow 
source B is so powerful or charismatic that we will start convinc-
ing ourselves to prefer it to A, or start using it to reinterpret A’s 
response—even though A is more reliable than B! 
In such a situation, something like the plain meaning rule 
would be a rational result: consult A first, and consult B only if A 
is unsure. This is better than always consulting both, because we 
avoid the biasing effect of B in cases where A is more likely to be 
correct. And it is probably better than never consulting B because 
we avoid “throwing away” the relevant information of B in cases 
where A is unsure. 
Now, even in this scenario, it is not certain that consulting B 
is a good idea, for two reasons. First, it is possible that there could 
be moral objections to the form of bias at issue in B. (As we dis-
cuss, one could imagine that B involves demographic stereotypes 
or political partisanship, for example.) If so, one might actually 
prefer never to use B, even at the cost of accuracy. Second, even 
in cases where A is unsure, A still might yield some information. 
True equipoise is rare.64 So considering B when A is unsure still 
risks overpowering the more reliable A with the less reliable B. It 
is just that this is one of A’s less reliable moments, so the risk is 
smaller. 
To describe this much less formally, think of a job interview. 
One might well think that a candidate’s suitability for a job is 
best assessed by reading her resume. One might also think that 
in-person interviews are a useful, but secondary, source of infor-
mation about a candidate’s suitability. On the other hand, in-
person interviews can introduce subconscious biases, favoring 
 
 64 See, for example, O’Neal v McAninch, 513 US 432, 435 (1995) (noting that in 
“unusual” cases the judge might “feel[ ] himself in virtual equipose”). 
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candidates who are more attractive, who have particular demo-
graphic characteristics, etc.65 And yet, because the biases are sub-
conscious, one may not be able to fully correct for them either. 
Indeed, one might worry that the irrelevant factors one learns 
from the interview will color one’s view of the paper record in a 
way that one can’t in good faith disentangle.66 
In that case, it seems quite sensible for an employer to decide 
that candidates with very strong or very weak paper records will 
be in or out on that basis alone. The philosophy department at 
Princeton, for example, does entry-level hiring without conduct-
ing in-person interviews for these and similar reasons.67 (Or for 
certain jobs, instead of a paper record, one might have a blind 
audition, as orchestras have discovered.)68 One might still resort 
to in-person interviews as a tiebreaker, but only in cases where 
the resumes or other blind qualifications are indeterminate. This 
obtains useful information while reducing bias. 
Is this too far-fetched to be helpful to the plain meaning rule? 
We are not so sure. It seems at least conceivable to us that some-
thing like the practical consequences of a statutory interpretation 
might fit this model. Judges might well be committed to the view 
that practical consequences are relevant but of secondary im-
portance to more standard legal materials like text and so on. On 
the other hand, judges might also worry that once they take into 
account practical considerations, it is hard to think clearly about 
anything else, and hard to resist the urge to start reinterpreting 
the standard materials to match the consequences the judges 
want to see. Alternatively, even if judges are confident in their 
own ability to weigh practical consequences appropriately, those 
same judges might worry about the ability of other judges to do 
the same. 
 
 65 See generally, for example, Regina Pingitore, et al, Bias against Overweight Job 
Applicants in a Simulated Employment Interview, 79 J Applied Psychology 909 (1994); 
David C. Gilmore, Terry A. Beehr, and Kevin G. Love, Effects of Applicant Sex, Applicant 
Physical Attractiveness, Type of Rater and Type of Job on Interview Decisions, 59 J Occu-
pational Psychology 103 (1986); Comila Shahani, Robert L. Dipboye, and Thomas M. 
Gehrlein, Attractiveness Bias in the Interview: Exploring the Boundaries of an Effect, 14 
Basic & Applied Soc Psychology 317 (1993). 
 66 See David Hausman, Note, How Congress Could Reduce Job Discrimination by 
Promoting Anonymous Hiring, 64 Stan L Rev 1343, 1349–55 (2012). 
 67 See Farewell to the Eastern APA, Redux? (Leiter Reports: A Philosophy Blog, Sept 
13, 2011), archived at http://perma.cc/JJR4-LVBQ?type=image (discussing Princeton’s in-
terview policy in the comments). 
 68 See generally Claudia Goldin and Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The 
Impact of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 Am Econ Rev 715 (2000). 
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If this bias is worrisome—and it might be especially worri-
some if the practical considerations are ones with deeply con-
tested partisan valences—then we can see why judges might want 
the plain meaning rule to deal with it: Blind themselves to prac-
tical consequences in a range of cases where the text is clear and 
therefore the likelihood of changing the outcome is small relative 
to the likelihood of bias. But consider practical consequences 
when the text is unclear, and the information provided by those 
consequences is more important. 
But again, even so, this bias justification for the plain mean-
ing rule is tricky. The biasing information has to be of a specific 
type that slightly defies rational thought. And it has to be useful 
enough to be worth accepting that bias in some cases, and yet not 
so useful that it is worth accepting that bias in all cases.69 That 
might happen to be true of something like practical consequences, 
but we do not really know for sure. (So far as we know, neither 
the Princeton philosophy department nor orchestras suddenly 
start resorting to in-person interviews or auditions when it is a 
close case.) 
At the same time, we are fairly confident that most other 
instances of the plain meaning rule—when dealing with titles, 
statutory context, legislative history, etc.—could not be justified 
this way. Judges are likely capable of rationally counting or dis-
counting this material as appropriate. Or, at least, they are as 
capable of dealing rationally with this material as they are with 
anything else. 
C. Legal Convention 
An alternative justification, of sorts, might proceed in a more 
legalistic way: judges should follow the plain meaning rule be-
cause it is a rule, and judges should follow the rules. We recognize 
that this argument sounds hilariously circular—where did the 
rule come from?—but we think a version of it can be made to work. 
One way is by focusing on the “law of interpretation.” This 
argument requires us first to accept that rules of statutory inter-
pretation can be set by law, in which case they need not be justi-
fied on first-order normative grounds. (Judges should follow the 
rules of criminal procedure, one might say, not because the rules 
 
 69 We would add that this justification is even harder to sustain if the plain meaning 
threshold is itself subject to bias, as some have argued. See notes 85–94 and accompanying 
text. 
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are necessarily justified on first principles but because judges 
have assumed an obligation to follow the rules.) The second step 
is to accept that those rules can also be established by unwritten 
law, judicial custom that we often call common law.70 
Under this argument, maybe the plain meaning rule is 
simply a common-law rule of statutory interpretation. It might 
not make perfect logical sense, but judges should apply it just as 
much as they apply other logically imperfect common-law rules. 
There is another variation of this argument: Even if one does 
not accept that unwritten law can create binding rules of inter-
pretation (though one should!), one could arrive at a version of 
this argument through expectations. Perhaps Congress knows 
about the plain meaning rule and intends (or means) that its work 
should be interpreted through the rule. 
These justifications seem logically possible to us, but we still 
have doubts about them. As to the second, expectations-based ver-
sion of the argument, recent empirical research by Professors 
Abbe Gluck and Lisa Bressman has suggested that Congress does 
not know very much about the Supreme Court’s statutory inter-
pretation rules, suggesting that we should be hesitant to justify 
interpretive rules purely on the basis of expectations.71 To be sure, 
the plain meaning rule might turn out to be an exception. The 
Gluck and Bressman study did report that when asked to name 
an “interpretive rule[ ] or convention[ ] in particular you think 
that the U.S. Supreme Court consistently follows,”72 staffers did 
frequently come up with “the plain meaning rule” by name.73 But 
because of the strictly consistent, empirical method of the study, 
we do not know if the respondents specifically had in mind the 
consider-only-in-case-of-ambiguity version of the plain meaning 
 
 70 For an extended argument in defense of these claims, see William Baude and 
Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 Harv L Rev 1079, 1104–18 (2017). 
 71 See generally Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation 
from the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Can-
ons: Part I, 65 Stan L Rev 901 (2013); Lisa Schultz Bressman and Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory 
Interpretation from the Inside—an Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, 
and the Canons: Part II, 66 Stan L Rev 725 (2014). 
 72 Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside: Methods Appendix *40 (Stanford Law Review, May 2013), archived at 
http://perma.cc/SR6K-6UPA. 
 73 Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev at 995 (cited in note 71). 
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rule or instead associated “plain” with “ordinary”74 or something 
else.75 
Similarly, we doubt that the plain meaning rule is sufficiently 
well established to qualify as a binding rule of the unwritten law 
of interpretation. While such rules can be valid even if Congress 
is not deeply familiar with them,76 discussion of the plain meaning 
rule is sufficiently confused that we still doubt that the rule qual-
ifies.77 It is more plausible, however, that some limited instances 
of the plain meaning rule could be part of the law of interpreta-
tion—for instance, one of us has argued that this is the best way 
to judge the “substantive” canons of interpretation.78 
In any event, even if one of these convention-based justifica-
tions for the plain meaning rule did hold, it would be a justifica-
tion of a limited sort. It would justify judges’ invoking and apply-
ing the rule now, but it would tell us little about whether we ought 
to change the convention going forward, or about whether we 
ought to replicate it when implementing authoritative rules of in-
terpretation in other contexts. Indeed, if one accepts our other nor-
mative doubts about the plain meaning rule, then those doubts 
provide reason to approach these conventions with a wary eye. 
D. Public-Facing Explanation 
It is also possible that there is a difference between a court’s 
own reasoning process and the reasoning process it presents to 
the audience of its opinions. Or, to put a finer point on it, maybe 
the plain meaning doctrine is a public lie or, more generously, an 
oversimplification.79 The court does in fact consider all of the evi-
dence, but it does not want the reader to do so because it does not 
trust the reader to weigh the evidence accurately. 
For instance, when interpreting a statute, maybe a judge re-
ally does consider the title of the statute, or the legislative history, 
even when the text seems plain to that judge. (Indeed, one would 
often have to go out of one’s way not to consider it, and we doubt 
that Justice Kagan gets mad at her clerks if they tell her the title 
 
 74 See note 40 and accompanying text. 
 75 See Abbe Gluck, Professor of Law, Yale Law School, E-mail to William Baude (Jan 
21, 2016) (on file with authors). 
 76 See Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1108–09 (cited in note 70). 
 77 See Part I. 
 78 Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1121–22 (cited in note 70). 
 79 See, for example, Return of the Jedi (Lucasfilm 1983) (“So, what I told you was 
true—from a certain point of view.”). 
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of the statute or present her with other information outside of a 
clear text.)80 Perhaps judges do not think those things are really 
irrelevant, the same way they might think that a litigant’s race or 
criminal history is irrelevant.81 At the same time, they want to 
encourage the reader not to worry herself about them. 
Under this justification, then, it is not actually true that out-
side information is ignored when the meaning is plain. Rather, 
judges think that the outside information will change the purely 
textual result only in an unusual case, and when the information 
does not change the result, it is better to pretend that it could not 
have changed the result. In other words, the court considers both 
text and other materials, but in cases in which the text wins, the 
court pretends it did not look at the other materials in the first 
place. 
Why might a court do this? Perhaps it does not fully trust its 
audience. When presenting its textual argument to nonjudges 
and even lay people, who are not as steeped in the court’s conven-
tions of statutory interpretation, it makes sense to speak in acces-
sible shorthand. Courts really mean something like, “When the 
text is 80 percent clear, it is almost impossible for even 100 per-
cent clear legislative history to outweigh it.” But it is easier for 
courts to say, as they do, that we should not even consider the 
legislative history at all in cases of textual clarity. 
Or, to put it slightly less nobly, maybe judges worry that ac-
knowledging the countervailing factor will make their interpreta-
tion seem much weaker. Better to invoke a legalistic-sounding 
reason that the title and legislative history do not matter rather 
than to candidly say: “True enough, but still . . . the text wins.” 
As a descriptive matter, these accounts seem plausible to us, 
at least some of the time. But as a normative matter, they raise 
the usual questions about a duty of judicial sincerity.82 And, in 
any event, they “justify” invocations of the plain meaning rule 
only in the pyrrhic sense of saying that none of them should be 
taken seriously by legally sophisticated readers. 
 
 80 Indeed, in several cases in which the Court has invoked the plain meaning rule, it 
has gone on to discuss the evidence it just declared irrelevant. See, for example, Milner, 
562 US at 572, 578–80 (Kagan). 
 81 But see Justin Driver, Recognizing Race, 112 Colum L Rev 404, 432–38 (2012) 
(noting “gratuitous” judicial references to the race of litigants and others). 
 82 See generally Micah Schwartzman, Judicial Sincerity, 94 Va L Rev 987 (2008); 
David L. Shapiro, In Defense of Judicial Candor, 100 Harv L Rev 731 (1987). But see gen-
erally Scott Altman, Beyond Candor, 89 Mich L Rev 296 (1990). 
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E. Predictability and Consistency 
Additionally, the plain meaning rule might make sense—un-
der certain extremely specific assumptions—if one were willing to 
trade accuracy for predictability. Suppose, for example, that a reg-
ulated private party cares not very much about whether she has 
the meaning of the statute “right” in the abstract, but cares a 
great deal about whether she correctly guesses how a judge will 
interpret the statute. That party might prefer that the range of 
considerations for a judge be limited in cases in which one consid-
eration—the text—points clearly in one direction. “If I look up the 
statute and see that it says clearly what I can do,” she might rea-
son, “I want to be able to take that to the bank.” 
A judge might reason similarly, regarding consistency in 
decision-making across courts as worth promoting so long as the 
accuracy trade-off is minimal. Thus, a judge might think it best 
to stop if the text is “clear” because she is confident that her col-
leagues would read the statute in the same way. More still, be-
cause plain meaning is reasonably probative of statutory mean-
ing, the resulting gains in consistency would be accompanied by 
only minimal losses in accuracy. 
As before, note that this justification requires some tricky as-
sumptions. It is not enough to argue—as many have83—that text 
is a useful coordinating point. That argument would be more 
likely to point toward textualism across the board. Rather, it re-
quires an argument that text is only sometimes useful as a coor-
dinating point. The underlying intuition seems to be that when 
the text is plain, the coordinating function is strong and the loss 
in accuracy is weak, but when the text is less plain, we should flip 
to emphasizing accuracy over coordination.84 
 
 83 Professor Frederick Schauer, for example, has argued that a general presumption 
in favor of ordinary meaning has a coordinating function, because it is likely to serve as 
“common ground” among members of a linguistic community. Schauer, 1990 S Ct Rev at 
250–56 (cited in note 40). For that reason, Schauer has argued, a “group of [otherwise-] 
diverse decisionmakers might suppress some of that diversity and achieve agreement” by 
substantially restricting the basis for decision-making to that which is common to the 
group, namely, ordinary meaning. Frederick Schauer, The Practice and Problems of Plain 
Meaning: A Response to Aleinikoff and Shaw, 45 Vand L Rev 715, 724–25 (1992). This 
argument does not seem to point toward the conditional evidence rules of the plain mean-
ing rule. 
 84 An intriguing suggestion that might work along these lines comes from Professor 
Adam M. Samaha, who has argued that the need for a random tiebreaker can be reduced 
by “moving a relevant variable into a lexically inferior position. The reduction in ties from 
lexical ordering is usually greater than the reduction from adding the same variable to the 
mix of other relevant considerations. The cost, however, is a higher error rate.” Adam M. 
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Maybe that argument could work, but it rests on several em-
pirical assumptions. And these assumptions seem even more 
questionable than in the examples above. 
The first required assumption is that the plain meaning 
threshold is itself reasonably plain—in other words, that most in-
terpreters can agree on which textual meanings are plain. Con-
sider the regulated private party who wants to “take it to the 
bank.” For her to do so sensibly, her perception of the plainness 
of the statute’s meaning would itself need to be widely shared. If, 
by contrast, interpreters frequently disagree over whether a stat-
ute’s meaning is plain, then the private party cannot be sure that 
what is plain to her will be plain to others. 
Worse, if courts do not agree on the plainness thresholds in 
particular cases, the plain meaning rule can actually exacerbate 
unpredictability. Courts that are 80 percent sure from the text 
that the statute means X will sit resolute in their convictions, be-
cause the plain meaning rule tells them to consider no other evi-
dence. Courts that are merely 54 percent sure from the text that 
the statute means X, however, will open the door to other evi-
dence, which in turn increases the risk that they will move from 
X to something else. Because the plain meaning rule creates an 
interpretive cliff between “plain” and “nonplain” meaning, the 
predictability of that threshold becomes important to predicting 
what courts will do. 
The current evidence suggests that this assumption is false—
that is, the plain meaning threshold is highly vulnerable to dis-
pute (good faith and otherwise85). The leading empirical study 
showed that different interpreters attribute ambiguity to the 
same text at quite different rates,86 and that those “simple judg-
ments about ambiguity are entwined with policy preferences, and 
. . . there may well be a causal relationship between them.”87 It 
also showed that even when asked a less policy-laden question, to 
predict whether others will find a text ambiguous, interpreters 
 
Samaha, On Law’s Tiebreakers, 77 U Chi L Rev 1661, 1664 (2010). He went on to discuss 
the plain meaning rule as an example of lexical priority, though he acknowledged that 
other tiebreakers are available in some cases (such as lenity in criminal cases). See id at 
1708–10. 
 85 See Ryan D. Doerfler, The Scrivener’s Error, 110 Nw U L Rev 811, 840–41 (2016) 
(discussing willful or motivated mischaracterization of the clarity of legislative texts). 
 86 See generally Ward Farnsworth, Dustin F. Guzior, and Anup Malani, Ambigu-
ity about Ambiguity: An Empirical Inquiry into Legal Interpretation, 2 J Legal Analysis 
257 (2010). 
 87 Id at 271. 
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remained divided.88 Another study, this one of contract interpre-
tation, found that both judges and laypeople overestimate the ex-
tent to which their interpretation is widely shared.89 “Thus,” the 
study concluded, “a judge may consider language to be plain when 
in fact different people do not understand it the same way, and 
this may happen even when the judge’s understanding is shared 
only by a minority of people in general.”90 
Even worse, Judge Brett Kavanaugh, a sitting judge on the 
DC Circuit, has asserted that his colleagues cannot even agree on 
what the plain meaning threshold is. He reported: 
In practice, I probably apply something approaching a 65-35 
rule. In other words, if the interpretation is at least 65-35 
clear, then I will call it clear and reject reliance on ambiguity-
dependent canons. I think a few of my colleagues apply more 
of a 90-10 rule, at least in certain cases. Only if the proffered 
interpretation is at least 90-10 clear will they call it clear. By 
contrast, I have other colleagues who appear to apply a 55-45 
rule. If the statute is at least 55-45 clear, that’s good enough 
to call it clear. 
 Who is right in that debate? Who knows?91 
Kavanaugh also went on to agree that “even if my colleagues and 
I could agree on 65-35” as the threshold for clarity, it would be 
“difficult” for them to apply it “neutrally, impartially, and predict-
ably.”92 Rather, “the magic wand of ipse dixit is the standard tool 
for deciding such matters.”93 For these reasons, Kavanaugh advo-
cated “eliminating or reducing threshold determinations of clarity 
versus ambiguity.”94 
A second assumption required for the consistency-and-accuracy 
argument is that nontextual evidence is substantially less probative 
 
 88 See, for example, id at 272 (“All respondents considering that case are 55 percent 
likely to say the statute is ambiguous when asked for an external judgment.”). 
 89 See Lawrence Solan, Terri Rosenblatt, and Daniel Osherson, False Consensus Bias 
in Contract Interpretation, 108 Colum L Rev 1268, 1285–94 (2008). 
 90 Id at 1294. 
 91 Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2137–38 (cited in note 37) (citation 
omitted). 
 92 Id at 2138. 
 93 Id at 2140 (quotation marks and brackets omitted), quoting Farnsworth, Guzior, 
and Malani, 2 J Legal Analysis at 276 (cited in note 86). 
 94 Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2134 (cited in note 37) (emphasis 
omitted). Even Justice Scalia and Professor Garner, after describing the plain meaning 
rule as “essentially sound,” conceded that it is “largely unhelpful, since determining what 
is unambiguous is eminently debatable.” Scalia and Garner, Reading Law at 436 (cited in 
note 42). 
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of statutory meaning than is text viewed in isolation. To see why, 
consider a case in which text in isolation points plainly in one di-
rection but nontextual evidence points plainly in another. In such 
a case, a court that considers just the text will have reasonably 
high confidence as to statutory meaning.95 If nontextual evidence 
has only limited weight, going on to consider that evidence will 
predictably leave the court only less confident. The reason is that 
considering this less weighty evidence will not alter the court’s 
confidence very much, certainly not enough to make it as or more 
confident in the alternate reading that the nontextual evidence 
supports.96 If, by contrast, nontextual evidence has significant 
weight, going on to consider it may leave the court as or more 
confident in the alternate reading—particularly so if the nontex-
tual evidence has an undercutting effect, undermining the eviden-
tial connection between the text in isolation and the initial read-
ing (for example, by making apparent a previously unrecognized 
ambiguity).97 The predictability of the plain meaning rule thus de-
pends on the nontextual evidence that is being excluded having 
limited probative value.98 
 
 95 This should be the case regardless of whether a court regards the text as “clear.” 
See text accompanying note 91. Even if a court takes the text to be less than clear, it should 
still be reasonably confident in the interpretation supported by the text in isolation (for 
example, a confidence level of 0.7 as opposed to 0.9), at least absent additional, nontextual 
evidence. 
 96 Again, this should be the case regardless of perceived clarity. As a practical matter, 
this is crucial to the attractiveness of the plain meaning rule because otherwise the rule 
would allow for wildly divergent outcomes depending on whether a text is regarded as 
clear or slightly less than clear. 
 97 See John L. Pollock, Contemporary Theories of Knowledge 37–39 (Rowman & 
Littlefield 1986) (distinguishing between “rebutting” defeaters, which prevent evidence E 
from supporting belief in proposition P by supporting not-P more strongly, and “undercut-
ting” defeaters, which prevent E from supporting belief in P by undermining the apparent 
rational connection between E and P) (emphasis omitted). 
 98 Philosopher Lara Buchak has argued that, as a matter of both instrumental and 
epistemic rationality, a “risk-avoidant agent” sometimes does best not to consider all avail-
able evidence before making a decision, even if considering additional evidence is cost free. 
See Lara Buchak, Instrumental Rationality, Epistemic Rationality, and Evidence-Gathering, 
24 Philosophical Persp 85, 96–101 (2010). On the standard picture of instrumental rational-
ity, an instrumentally rational agent maximizes expected utility, which is to say that, of two 
acts, an instrumentally rational agent prefers the one with the higher expected-utility 
value. In a classic paper, Professor I.J. Good showed that, assuming away behavioral ir-
rationalities of the sort discussed in Part III.B, so long as considering additional evidence 
is cost free, it always maximizes expected utility to do so before making a decision. See 
generally I.J. Good, On the Principle of Total Evidence, 17 Brit J Phil Sci 319 (1967). From 
this, Good inferred that it is always instrumentally rational to consider such evidence and, 
from this, that to do so is always epistemically rational as well—that is, rational in one’s 
capacity as an agent concerned with truth or knowledge. See generally id. In her work, 
Buchak has offered an alternative to the standard picture of instrumental, and in turn 
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This empirical assumption is also open to question. As both of 
us have argued elsewhere, a court’s perception of what Congress 
is trying to say depends in large part on that court’s understand-
ing of what Congress is trying to do.99 By unsettling a court’s pri-
ors about what Congress is plausibly trying to do, nontextual evi-
dence can thus alter significantly a court’s assessment of what 
Congress is attempting to say. For example, taken in isolation, a 
rule that reads, “No police officers are permitted,” would seem to 
tell law enforcement officials to stay away. Add as additional con-
text, however, that the text appears beneath the heading, “Cos-
tume restrictions for Halloween party,” and that interpretation 
becomes much less obvious. Whether nontextual evidence can un-
settle priors in this way—and, hence, exert significant eviden-
tiary weight—is difficult to assess on a categorical basis. Some-
times bad practical consequences will, for instance, reveal a 
particular interpretation as implausible.100 Other times, though, 
such consequences will show only that the most plausible inter-
pretation is also bad policy.101 
It may well be that some instances (or even all instances) of 
the plain meaning rule could be shown to satisfy these assump-
tions. But the current evidence makes that unlikely, and in any 
event we are pretty sure that those who invoke the plain meaning 
rule have rarely satisfied themselves of it. 
 
epistemic, rationality, arguing that actual agents are—according to Buchak, reasonably—
risk avoidant in the sense that such agents are unwilling to accept the possibility of a loss 
in exchange for an equivalently sized possibility of a gain. See generally, for example, Lara 
Buchak, Risk and Rationality (Oxford 2013). Needless to say, assessing the merits of 
Buchak’s alternative, risk-avoidant picture of rationality goes well beyond the scope of this 
Article. See Buchak, 24 Philosophical Persp at 96 (cited in note 98) (conceding that there 
are “those who are inclined to think that theories like [hers] are theories of predictable 
irrationality”) (emphasis added). Of special interest here, though, is Buchak’s observation 
that, to the extent that risk avoidance is rational, a risk-avoidant agent ought not to con-
sider additional cost-free evidence under certain conditions. Specifically, Buchak showed 
that a risk-avoidant agent should refuse to consider such evidence if she is “antecedently 
fairly confident that X” and if that evidence could “tell somewhat in favor of ~X but not 
strongly in favor of ~X,” that is, if the evidence at issue has only limited weight. Id at 100 
(emphasis omitted). Thus, to the extent that risk avoidance recommends ignoring additional 
evidence, it does so under similar conditions as does the predictability-and-consistency ra-
tionale articulated here. 
 99 See Baude and Sachs, 130 Harv L Rev at 1144–45 (cited in note 70); Ryan D. 
Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 Duke L J 979, 994–98 (2017). 
 100 See, for example, United States v X-Citement Video, Inc, 513 US 64, 69–70 (1994). 
 101 See, for example, Pavelic & LeFlore v Marvel Entertainment Group, 493 US 120, 
126 (1989). 
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F. Contract Analogies 
Finally, we think it instructive to contrast the plain mean-
ing rule with seemingly analogous arguments in interpretation 
of private law. Consider first Professor Eric Posner’s argument 
in favor of the parol evidence rule in contract law,102 which has 
some analogies to the predictability justification canvassed 
above. The parol evidence rule forbids courts from considering 
extrinsic evidence of a contract’s meaning unless that contract 
is incomplete or ambiguous on its face.103 Posner defended the 
rule on the ground that “parties derive advantage from being 
able, in their contract, to limit the evidence a court can use to 
decide a dispute should one arise,” because, among other 
things, limiting admissible evidence reduces variance in judi-
cial outcomes.104 
For our purposes, what is particularly instructive about 
Posner’s argument is that it highlights several important differ-
ences between contracts and legislation, and therefore between 
the parol evidence rule and the plain meaning rule. First, Posner’s 
claim concerning derived advantage rests in large part on the 
empirical observation that contracting parties make frequent 
use of so-called “merger” clauses, which are clauses directing 
courts not to consider extrinsic evidence, whereas “anti-merger” 
clauses, which are clauses directing courts to consider such evi-
dence, are more or less unknown.105 In legislation, by contrast, 
analogues of merger clauses are rare,106 whereas analogues of 
 
 102 See generally Eric A. Posner, The Parol Evidence Rule, the Plain Meaning Rule, 
and the Principles of Contractual Interpretation, 146 U Pa L Rev 533 (1998). 
 103 See id at 534. Posner referred to this as “hard-PER,” distinguished from softer 
versions of the rule. Id at 534–35. 
 104 Id at 570–71. See also id at 543. Posner also argued that contracting parties share 
an intention about the conventions of contract interpretation, see id at 570, somewhat 
analogous to the argument we discuss in Part III.C. 
 105 Id at 570–71. 
 106 For the rare example, see Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 105(b), Pub L No 102-166, 105 
Stat 1071, 1075, codified at 42 USC § 1981 note: 
No statements other than the interpretive memorandum appearing at Vol. 137 
Congressional Record S 15276 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991) shall be considered legis-
lative history of, or relied upon in any way as legislative history in construing 
or applying, any provision of this Act that relates to Wards Cove—Business 
necessity/cumulation/alternative business practice. 
See also Lawrence M. Solan, The Language of Statutes: Laws and Their Interpretation 187 
(Chicago 2010) (observing that “[e]ven such small limits” on what evidence of statutory 
meaning courts can consider “are not easy to find”). 
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antimerger clauses are, if anything, slightly less so.107 Neither is 
common. 
Second, Posner’s prediction of reduced variance under the 
parol evidence rule assumes the relative unpredictability of judi-
cial responsiveness to extrinsic evidence. Because the extrinsic 
evidence parties might introduce in a given case is so varied—
anything from “excerpts from the general chit-chat” to “pages of 
scrawled notes”—Posner inferred that how a given court will re-
spond to the evidence introduced is much less predictable than 
how that court will respond to contractual language in isolation.108 
By contrast, the major categories of nontextual evidence in statu-
tory interpretation are more systematic, and so judicial respon-
siveness to such evidence is more predictable. At a practical level, 
for example, we think many lawyers have a good guess as to how 
different justices on the Supreme Court would respond to the in-
vocation of a committee report. 
Finally, Posner’s argument assumes that contracting parties 
are responsive to judicial interpretive rules. Plausible as that as-
sumption might be for contracts, there are two reasons to doubt 
it in the case of legislation. One reason is recent empirical work 
that suggests that legislative drafters do not know much about 
the judicial interpretive rules.109 The other is that the transaction 
costs for negotiating legislation are much higher than they are for 
contracts because of both the complexity and the conventions of 
legislation.110 (Related elements of the legislative process may 
give legislators more reason than contracting parties to be strate-
gically vague in drafting.)111 
 
 107 See, for example, 16 USC § 831dd (“This chapter shall be liberally construed to . . . 
provide for the national defense, improve navigation, control destructive floods, and pro-
mote interstate commerce and the general welfare.”); 18 USC § 3731 (“The provisions of 
this section shall be liberally construed to effectuate its purposes.”). 
 108 Posner, 146 U Pa L Rev at 572 (cited in note 102). 
 109 See generally Gluck and Bressman, 65 Stan L Rev 901 (cited in note 71). See also 
generally Victoria F. Nourse and Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 NYU L Rev 575 (2002). 
 110 See Posner, 146 U Pa L Rev at 553–55 (cited in note 102) (observing that the parol 
evidence rule is least likely to be useful when transaction costs are high (as when the text 
is complex) and when the form of the contract at issue is conventional (as is the case with, 
for example, ordinary consumer contracts)). See also Jarrod Shobe, Intertemporal Statu-
tory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114 Colum L Rev 807, 816 
(2014) (describing the professionalization of the legislative drafting process, noting the 
emphasis on “consistency of legislative drafting”); Josh Chafetz, The Phenomenology of 
Gridlock, 88 Notre Dame L Rev 2065, 2075 (2013) (“The United States federal government 
has a relatively [ ] cumbersome process for enacting laws.”). 
 111 See Christine Kexel Chabot, Selling Chevron, 67 Admin L Rev 481, 522–25 (2015). 
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As the example of the parol evidence rule suggests, practical 
differences between contracting and legislating will often differ-
entiate the plain meaning rule from superficially similar rules of 
contract law. Such practical differences also explain away another 
superficially similar rule, the so-called best evidence rule, which 
conditions the admissibility of secondary evidence (for example, 
facsimile or oral description) of the contents of a document on the 
unavailability of the original copy.112 As Professor Frederick 
Schauer has observed, strict application of the best evidence rule 
“imposes cumbersome requirements on the introduction of reliable 
secondary evidence.”113 Nonetheless, Schauer reasoned, the best 
evidence rule is plausibly justifiable as an evidence-generating 
rule, because, by making it difficult for parties to introduce (pre-
sumably reliable) secondary evidence, the rule incentivizes par-
ties to preserve and produce (presumably more reliable) primary 
evidence.114 
As noted above, that legislators respond to incentives set by 
interpretive rules is, at best, questionable. More to the point here, 
though, is that the practical problem the best evidence rule is de-
signed to solve—failure to preserve and produce primary evi-
dence—does not exist with respect to legislation, at least not to-
day.115 In the modern era, primary evidence of the contents of 
legislation (for example, the Statutes at Large and the United 
States Code) is available at the click of a mouse. There is thus no 
need to cajole legislators or litigants to further preserve and pro-
duce that evidence. 
CONCLUSION 
There is much to be said about the comparative superiority of 
text, statutory context, legislative history, consequences, and so 
on in statutory interpretation. In this Article, we’ve tried to make 
 
 112 See, for example, Sirico v Cotto, 324 NYS2d 483, 485–86 (NY City Civ 1971). 
 113 Schauer, 155 U Pa L Rev at 198 (cited in note 47). 
 114 Id. 
 115 By contrast, in the decades after the Founding, statutes “were not regularly pub-
lished,” and “[e]ven when copies of records could be found, the copies themselves were 
highly unreliable.” Stephen E. Sachs, Full Faith and Credit in the Early Congress, 95 Va L 
Rev 1201, 1209–10 (2009). As Professor Stephen E. Sachs showed, this made the best evi-
dence rule highly important to statutes at the Founding (and central to the Constitution’s 
Full Faith and Credit Clause). See id at 1209–12. 
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a related but different intervention, about the relationship be-
tween those things.116 Whatever one thinks of the probative value 
of text and other evidence, it’s not at all obvious why one source’s 
probative value should depend on the other. 
The plain meaning rule reflects that kind of puzzling inter-
dependence. There are indeed conditions under which such a rule 
would make sense, but they are more complicated and less uni-
versal than most uses of the plain meaning rule seem to as-
sume.117 It may well be that most interpreters should simply have 
the courage of their convictions—either to consider nontextual 
evidence in all cases or to ignore it across the board. 
Ultimately, though, we come neither to praise the plain 
meaning rule nor to bury it. Our main aim is to challenge those 
who use the rule to consider and explain why they think nontex-
tual evidence is relevant at some times but not at others—and to 
show all readers that the challenge is harder to answer than they 
might have first thought. 
 
 116 Ironically, the plain meaning rule may in fact cause courts to devalue the statutory 
text. The plain meaning rule requires text to be considered first, to decide what other 
sources can be considered. But as Professor Samaha recently observed, empirical evidence 
suggests that, “[o]ften enough, last matters more than first” in that, as a psychological 
matter, decision-makers often attribute greater significance to evidence considered at the 
end of a sequence than at the beginning. Adam M. Samaha, Starting with the Text—on 
Sequencing Effects in Statutory Interpretation and Beyond, 8 J Legal Analysis 439, 456 
(2016). Thus, textualists who do decide to retain the plain meaning rule might do well to 
counsel “circling back” to the unclear text after other sources have been let in. Id at 481. 
 117 See Kavanaugh, Book Review, 129 Harv L Rev at 2135 n 87 (cited in note 37) 
(“[E]ach ambiguity-dependent canon should be independently evaluated. I am not propos-
ing a one-size-fits-all solution.”). 
